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IN THE SUPRE.IVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL T. PALMER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-VS-
WASATCH CHE,MICAL COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT 
In general respondent agrees with the sketchy 
statement of facts contained in appellant's brief. How-
ever, respondent deems it necessary to elaborate on ap-
pellant's statement and to point out the following facts 
which I believe are of great importance: 
A. It is admitted, by everyone, that chemically 
pure (CP) sulphuric acid, if pennitted to es-
cape from its container, is an inherently dan-
gerous instrumentality which if it comes in 
contact with the human being is capable of 
placing human life and limb in imminent dan-
ger, which facts were well known to appel-
lant. 
B. The acid which was in the glass jar when de-
livered weighed ninety eight pounds net and 
the empty glass jar and carboy weighed 35.5 
pounds, making a total weight of the con-
tainer and contents 133.5 pounds. Tr. 52. 
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C. That after the filled containers arrived in 
Salt Lake City at appellant's dock, they were 
unloaded from the car and placed on the dock; 
that thereafter said carboy was in the sole 
custody of appellant until delivered to re-
spondent in the storage room used for that 
purpose; that in filling the order for General 
Mills on May 16, 1958 the three carboys were 
taken from the warehouse and placed in a 
truck owned and operated by appellant 
(whether the shipment contained additional 
carboys is unknown). Furthermore, there is 
no positive evidence as to how these three 
carboys were packed in appellant's truck for 
delivery. Tr. 145 . Fred Mills, the driver 
who made the delivery, had nothing to do with 
the loading and he has no recollection as to 
how the carboys were fixed so as to prevent 
movement while enroute. Tr. 145; that there 
are lots of startings and stoppings of the 
truck enroute from Salt Lake City to Ogden. 
Tr. 146. 
D. When Mills, the driver, arrived in Ogden at 
General Mills office building, he unloaded 
these three carboys weighing 133.5 pounds 
each from the truck and placed them on the 
ground. He then obtained a small two wheeler 
hand truck and placed each carboy on it so 
that about one-half of the botton1 of the car-
boy rested on the foot brace. The remaining 
half had no support. He then transported 
them around to a rear stairway and trucked 
each down about twelve to fifteen steps to the 
place of storage. Tr. 138. He was asked: 
Q. "Was there any bumping as yon let them 
down the stairs f" 
2 
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A. "Yes, very much." Tr. 139. 
He then pushed the truck into the storeroom 
where the carboys were custmnarily stored 
and deposited the same on a cement floor. He 
made no inspection of the carboy when it was 
placed on the floor after its bumping ride 
down the steps. In fact, he made little or no 
inspection of the carboy from the time he 
started from Salt Lake City. When the bottorn 
fell out of the carboy it was picked up, to-
gether with the broken bottom and parts, 
which were placed in the broken carboy; that 
it was not touched until about August Sixth 
when one of appellant's drivers picked it up 
and returned it to appellant's dock where it 
remained for an hour or so and then an enl-
ployee of General Mills returned it to its plant 
where it remained under lock and key until 
brought into court. Only three of the bottom 
rubber bumpers or cleats which supported 
the glass bottle were produced (Tr. 12 and 
106) and the whereabouts of the remaining 
·one was not accounted for. In view of the 
evidence produced by defendant to the ·effect 
that if all bumpers are solidly placed the 
glass jar cannot drop from its position, it is 
fair to assume that the missing rubber buruper 
was absent when delivered to General :Mills 
and that the bumping ride down the steps and 
into the storage room dislodged the bottle and 
permitted it to rest entirely on the bottorn of 
the carboy; that the botton1 was not designed 
to carry the weight of the glass bottle ( 98 
pounds plus weight of the jar) and that when 
lifted fron1 the floor the ·entire bottmn be-
came dislodged. Tr. 37. In fact, there can be 
no question but what the accident happened 
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in the manner detailed by respondent's wit-
nesses. 
E. That the court submitted the- issue of 
breach of . warranty to the jury under eight 
special interrogatories, all of which were 
answered . by the jury in plaintiff's favor. 
The answers thereto were amply supported by 
the evidence. 
F. That at the conclusion of the trial the court 
dismissed plaintiff's first count (negligence) 
on the theory, as stated by the court, that res 
ipsa loquitor cannot apply to a retailer even 
though it involves an inherently dangerous 
instrumentality. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point l. The trial court was correct in submitting 
the issue of breach of warranty (Count 
Two) to the jury under special inter-
rogatories. 
Point 2. The trial court was in error in dismis-
sing respondent's first count (negli-
gence) and in refusing to submit this 
issue to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
We admit at the outset that the subject of liability 
in the so called "products liability field" both in ad-
judicated cases and text writers is fraught with diffi-
culty and uncertainty. The reason for this no doubt is 
due largely to a gradual break down of the strict com-
mon law rule which shield unreasonably both the manu-
facturer and jobber or retailerr where injury resulted 
to a purchaser or consumer of manufactured goods or 
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commodities. The first case to break away frorn the 
old rule was, 
McPherson vs. Buick 
111 N.E. 1050 
which was decided in 1916. The late Justice Cardozo is 
the author of this opinion. The case itself involved 
personal injury to a subvendee of an automobile having 
a latent defect. There was injected into the case the 
element of a dangerous instrumentality which because of 
a latent defect made the auto a dangerous instrumental-
ity, although in the absence of such a defect it was en-
tirely harmless. 
Harper and James, professors of law, Yale U niver-
sity, have recently authored a new text in three volumes 
covering the law of torts. It is of course impossible to 
quote at length the discussions found therein, all of 
which are supported by citations in the foot note. How-
ever, we will refer to a few general statements founded 
m this excellent work. 
Volume 2, Chapter 28, cornmencing at Page 1535, 
undertakes a discussion of the subject of liability of 
suppliers of chattels. Section 28.1 is an introductory· 
discussion of the subject wherein it is stated, among 
other things, 
"The older restrictive doctrine was well adapted 
to protect the manufacturer fro1n burdens on his 
activity, but it did so at the expense of the victims 
of his mistakes. The citadel of privity ha~ 
crumpled, and today the ordinary tests of duty, 
negligence and liability are applied widely to the 
man who supplies a chattel for the use of.another. 
This trend was responsive to ever-grow~ng pres-
-5 
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sure for .protection of the consumer, coupled with 
a realization that liability would not unduly in~ 
hibit the enterprise of manufacturers and that· 
they were well placed both to profit from its 
lessons and to distribute its burdens." 
Section 28.2, Page 1536 : 
"Anyone who supplies a chattel for use or custody 
or possession by another comes under· some duties 
arising out of the transaction. This is so whether 
the transaction is a gift, a sale, a loan, lease, or 
other bailment * * * * * * And the supplier will 
come under these duties whether he is owner, 
seller, maker, bailee, bailor, or custodian of the 
chattel." · 
Page 1539: 
"Since the supplier's duty of care 'extends to all 
who may foreseeably be hurt by lack of care, it 
is scarcely surprising that this duty is not neces-
sarily satisfied by disclosures of dangers." 
Page 1599: 
"If the dealer has been negligent, his liability i8 
no more circumscribed by privity than is the 
maker's. It extends to anyone who might fore-
seeably have been injured by the defect." · 
Section 28.30, Page 1599 discusses the subject of 
retailers strict liability. 
"1. Liabilities under warranties. The most com-
mon source of a retailer's liability for injury 
caused by defective chattels is either the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
poste, or that of 1nerchantability-which is in-
creasingly recognized as including a ·warranty 
of fitness for usual purposes. The injured person 
is more often in privity with the retailer than 
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with the maker; hence, a warranty theory is 
more often available in these cases." 
"The principal controversy concerning the re-
tailer's liability rages over the question whether 
or not he warrants the fitness of products ob-
tained from reputable suppliers and sold in their 
containers under circumstances where the buyer 
realizes that his seller could not and did not 
inspect the contents of the container. Probably 
the majority of the American courts (both at 
common law and under the Sales Act) now hold 
the retailer strictly on his warranty." 
"The retailer should bear this as one of the risks 
of his enterprise. He profits from the trans-
action and is in a fairly strategic position to 
promote safety through pressure on his supplier. 
Also, he is known to his customers and subject 
to their suits, while the maker is often 'nnknown 
and may well be beyond the process of any court 
convenient to the customer. Moreover, the re-
tailer is in a good position to pass the loss back 
to his supplier." 
Page 1602, 
"For the nwst part the same considerations that 
call for strict liability of the retailer also sup-
port strict liability of the wholesaler to the victirn. 
Surely if the retailer is to be held in warranty, 
he should be able to look to his supplier on a 
similar warranty." 
Section 28.32 summllrizes the entire chapter and 
deals with choice of remedies and Section 28.33, Page 
1605 evaluates the rules as previously discussed. 
It is to be noted from the foregoing authorities 
that the injured person rnay combine in one suit lia-
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bility both for negligence ·and breach of warranty. Plain-
tiff by his amended complaint- relied upon both. How-
ever, the court took from the jury the question of negli-
gence but submitted to the jury under special interro-
gatories the question of breach of warranty.. We 
reserve for future discussion this alleged error. Appel-
lant contends that the court erred in refusing to give 
his requested instructions, all of which were designed 
to be submitted to the jury under a general verdict. 
As previously noted, the court submitted the case to 
the jury on special interrogatories. We think the 
court's instructions fully and correctly instructed the 
jury and that no prejudicial error resulted. 
In answer to these interrogatories, the jury found 
as facts that: 
A. Plaintiff and his fellow employee raised the 
container in a reasonably prudent manner. 
B. That the acid was released when the carboy 
was being lifted. 
C. That the release of the acid presumably caused 
by the defects present in the bottle or car-
boy, or both. · 
D. That the facts as found were inconsistent with 
any other reasonable hypothesis but that a 
defect, or defects, in the bottle · or carboy 
proximately caused the release of the acid. 
E. That the facts as found were inconsistent with 
the hypothesis that the defect present on 
delivery was a substantial defect. 
B~aring in 1nind the oft repeated rule that the 
findings as made by th·e trier of the fac.t will be ·sus-
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s.tained if there is any substantial evidence .or any 
logical inference to support the same, we contend that 
these findings are amply supported by the evidence 
or logical inferences deducted therefrom and that the 
instructions are ample to support a special verdict. 
Appellant cites cases and texts writers relating 
to the liability of a retailer who merely acts as a con-
duit through which the goods pass from manufacturer 
to consumer. However, it must be noted that in this 
case the defendant was not merely a conduit through 
which the goods passed but here we are dealing with 
a situation where the retailer or jobber (defendant) 
delivered a commodity to the consumer by transporting 
the same from Salt Lake City to Ogden and then 
delivering the package to the place of storage, which 
gave rise to a situation that if in making this delivery 
and in exposing the package to dangers by the method 
adopted in bumping the same down a flight of stairs 
and then failing to inspect the sarne after the package 
had reached its destination, this would amount to a 
breach of warranty and negligence. In other words, 
the jobber was an active participant in the delivery 
of a commodity which, if improperly secured, became 
a highly dangerous instrurnentality. 
We believe that this court in two recent decisions 
has recognized this distinction : 
Schneider vs. Shuhrrnann, etal 
7 Utah 2nd ............... . 
327 P. 2nd, 822 
Bondon vs. Shuhrmann, etal 
7 Utah 2nd ................ . 
327 P. 2nd, 826 
.c 
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In both of these cases suit was brought against both 
the manufacturer · and the retailer. Judgment, how-
ever, was rendered ·against the retailer. The facts in 
these cases are that the retailer rendered a service to 
the commodity after he acquired the product from the 
supplier. If he failed to render this service properly 
then he was guilty of both negll.gence and breach of 
warranty, so in our case the jobber (defendant) rendered 
a service by delivering the commodity to the purchaser. 
If in the course of rendering that service he was negli-
gent or if as a result of this service the product was 
rendered inherently dangerous, a jury may find him 
guilty of negligence, or if as a result of this service 
the product was rendered inherently dangerous there 
is a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 
Appellant appears to make some point from the 
fact that the carboy and container were not sold to the 
purchaser. We fail to appreciate this distinction. Cer-
tainly it involved a bailment of the carboy and jar and 
there would certainly be a representationthat the same 
would hold the acid. Appellant contends there was a 
lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant. (See 
Page 20 of his brief). We have already cited authority 
to the effect that lack of privity is no longer adhered 
to when dealing with a dangerous instrumentality, the 
question being whether or not it was foreseeable that 
some third person might be injured while using the 
same. 
We cite the following additional cases which sustain 
our position: 
10 
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DiVello vs. Gardner Machine Company 
Ohio 
102 N. E. 2nd, 289 
Burr vs. Sherwin-Williams, etal 
California 
268 P. 2nd, 1051 
Spencer vs. Madsen 
Tenth Circuit 
142 Fed. 2nd, 820 
State Insurance Fund vs. City Chemical Corpor-
ation 
New York 
48 N .E. 2nd, 262 
Mueller vs. Bronx-Syhon Company 
New York 
6 N.Y. 2nd, 903 
See also 11 ALR Annotation commencing at Page 1251 
Chapman Chemical Company vs. Taylor 
222 S.W. 2nd, 820 
There is another point which we wish to develop 
in conll'ection with the liability of the supplier to the 
purchaser. Ths matter is discussed in Harper and 
James, Vol. 2, Section 28.28 at Page 1594 under the 
heading "WHO IS A MAKER". It is true that the 
name Allied Chemical and Dye is found on a label 
attached to the carboy but there is nothing contained 
therein which would indicate that the product was not 
in fact prepared by defendant. General Mills had pur-
chased this product from defendant and there is nothing 
to indicate that it ever knew that defendant was not 
in fact the maker of this product. The authors state 
at Page 1594 : 
"Under the prevailing modern rule, one who 
lJ 
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represents a product to be his own is subject to 
the same liability as though he were its. n1aker 
even if in fact it was manufactured by another." 
See large number of cases cited in note, Reinstatement 
torts, Section 400, comment D. 
There seems to be considerable confusion as to 
whether there must be privity of contract between the 
seller and the injured consumer and whether the strict 
liability of warranty implied in la'v is limited to foods 
or whether it should be extended to au· dangerous 
instrumentalities liable to cause human suffering or 
death. Thus subject is discussed in, 
Harper and James, Vol. 2, on Page 1569 and after 
some general discussion the authors at Page 1571 state: 
"But where commodities are dangerous to life 
and health, society's interest transcends that of 
protecting reasonable business expectations. It 
extends to minimizing the danger to consun1ers 
and putting the burden of their losses on thosP 
who best can minimize the danger and distribute 
equitably the losses that do occur. And since 
the warranties involved in these cases do not 
represent the expressed or ilnplied-in-fact intent 
of bargainers, but are warranties imposed by 
law as vehicles of social policy, the courts should 
~xtend them as far as the relevant social policy 
requires. 
Then after a general discussion the author at Page 
1573 concludes as follow·s: 
"No valid reason appears for distinguishing he-
tween food cases and others so far as the priYit~v 
requirem'ent is concerned." 
12 
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and in the footnote it cites the case of, 
Pillars vs. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
78 Southern, 365 
wherein the defendant contended that the maker of chew-
ing tobacco should not be held liable for impurities negli-
gently incorporated therein because tobacco was not food 
and privity was required for liability in cases not in-
volving food, beverages, etc. The court conceded that 
tobacco was not food "but we are of the opinion that 
we are not restricted to this narrow question, nor have 
we reached the limit when we admit that tobacco is not a 
beverage, or a condiment, or a drug. The fact that the 
courts have at this time made only the exceptions men-
tioned to the general rule does not prevent a step forward 
for the health and life of the public." The authors then 
conclude with the following comment under Note 14: 
"Even if it should be felt that the restriction 
should be relaxed gradually and first in the field 
of greatest danger, the food area is not neces-
sarily the most dangerous field. Greater peril 
lurks in a defective automobile wheel than in a 
pebble in a can of baked beans." 
Two interesting cases dealing with impure foods, 
privity contract and absolute warranty are, 
Decker vs. Kapp 
164 SW 2nd, 828 
a suit against the manufacturers of impure foods; and, 
Gregg Canning Company vs. Josey 
164 SW 2nd, 835 
decided the same day by the same court, this latter case 
involving a suit by consumer against retailer. In both 
13 
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instances the court held that in the case of impure food 
both the manufacturer and retailer are absolutely liable 
under a warranty implied in law without refe~ence to 
how the food was prepared or packed, or as to whether 
the manufacturer or seller had notice of the impurities. 
It seems to us that if this rule applies to impure 
foods and if as the authors suggest, there is no valid 
reason for distinguishing between food cases and others,. 
then it seems to us that this smne doctrine should be 
extended to explosives, or sulphuric acid which if al-
lowed to 'escape is deadly in character. 
POINT TWO 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE: Appellant 
complains of the failure of the trial court to instruct 
properly as to the law of contributory negligence. As 
a matter of fact, the court, when ruling on defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict, said: Tr. 234. 
"I'll rule out contributory negligence in this case 
on strict warranty. I can't see any possibility to 
it. I don't see enough facts to support contrib-
utory negligence." 
We think the trial court was correct in his ruling as 
to contributory negligence. It seems rather difficult 
to understand how defendant could contend that it was 
not negligent in failing to discover the defect and then 
claiming plaintiff was himself negligent in what he did. 
Furthermore, the answer of the jury to the special in-
terrogatories absolved plaintiff of any negligence. 
We contend, therefore, that the issue as to breach 
of i1nplied warranty presented an issue of fact to be 
14 
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submitted to the jury; that the court was justified in 
submitting this issue through special interrogatories; 
that the instructions of the court were full and complete 
and that in any event no prejudice resulted therefrom. 
We contend, therefore, that the judgment should be af-
firmed. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
CROSS APPEAL 
1. We contend that the court was in error in taking 
from the jury the issue as to negligence. We realize 
that if the judgrnent is sustained then this ruling be-
comes 1noot but if this court should reverse and order 
a new trial then this matter would become important 
and should be examined. The trial court based his 
ruling upon the grounds that the rule of res ipsa loquitur 
cannot be invoked against a retailer. We think, there-
fore, that the trial court was clearly in error. We con-
tend first that independently of the application of the 
rule there was sufficient evidence of defendant's negli-
gence to submit to the jury. In support of our con-
tention we again call to the court's attention the fact 
that after defendant had obtained possession of the 
carboy, it undertook to render an additional service; 
namely, to transport it to Ogden and deliver it to the 
basement of General Mills. If in rendering this service 
defendant was negligent and if such negligence con-
tributed to the accident, then this became an issuable 
fact to submit to the jury. 
2. Secondly, we contend that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur applies in this case and that the applica-
tion of the rule n1akes it an issuable fact to be sub-
15 
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bitted to the jury. 
1. Considering the deadly effect of sulphuric acid; 
the breakable nature of glass jars; the weight of the 
container, 133.5 pounds; the fact that only one-half of 
the bottom of the carboy was supported by the hand 
truck and then to bounce the same down twelve to fif~ 
teen stepes and then make no inspection of the carboy 
to ascertain the effect or condition, is sufficient in it-
self to justify submitting the issue of negligence to the 
jury. 
2. Res ipsa loquitur: For an exceUent discussion of 
this doctrine see, 
Harper and James, Vol. 2, commencing at Sec-
tion 19.5 Page 1075 and extending to Page 1107. 
We can only refer to some general observations. At 
Page 1081 the authors point out that the following 
conditions for the application of the doctrine are: 
1. The accident must be one that ordinarily 
would not occur in the absence of negligence. 
2. Both inspection and use must have been at 
the time of the injury in defendant's control. 
3. The injurious occurrences or conditions n1ust 
have happen'ed irrespective of any voluntary 
act on plaintiff's part. · 
The text then proceeds to discuss each of these prop~ 
ositions. Section 19.6 discusses point one. We think 
there can be little question but what the facts con1e with-
in point one. Point two is discussed in Section 19.7, 
Page 1085. It will no doubt be argued by defendant 
that the defendant parted with control when it deposited 
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the carboy in the storage roorn on May 16, 1958. How-
ever, as the text points out, the term "exclusive con-
trol" is frequently misunderstood and that the courts 
do not generally apply this requirement as it is literally 
stated. 
"The requirement as it is generally applied is 
more accurately stated as one that the evidence 
must afford a rational basis for concluding that 
the cause of the accident was probably such that 
the defendant would be responsible for any neg-
ligence connected with it." 
The jury by its affirmative answer to interrogatories 
4A and B found as a fact that the defect was present 
at the time defendant delivered the carboy. This find-
ing precludes any possibility that the def'ect arose or 
was created after the carboy had been delivered to 
General Mills. Point three is discussed in Section 19.8 
at Page 1093. H'ere again the jury found that the 
plaintiff and his assistant raised the container in a 
reasonably prudent manner. (Interrogatory No. 1.) We 
contend, therefore, that the evidence, together with the 
answers of the jury, brought the case strictly within 
the rule. For an exhaustive discussion of the rule and 
its application see, 
Yborra vs. Spangard 
Calif. 
154 P. 2nd, 687 
This court has recently had occasion to discuss the rule 
in the case of 
Joseph vs. L. D. S. Hospital 
348 P. 2nd, 935. 
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It is true that in this .case this court held that the rule 
did not apply for the reason that the evidence disclosed 
that the accident could occur without negligence on any-
one's part but we are confident that this. objection can-
not apply. The evidence points unerringly to the fact 
that this accident could not have happened but for 
n'egligence of either the defendant or Allied Chemical, 
or both. 
We have found no case nor text writer which has 
suggested that the rule cannot apply to a retailer, the 
reason advanced by the trial court. We can see no 
logical reason why it should not apply to a retail'er as 
well as a manufacturer if the retailer undertook to 
render a service involving a dangerous instrumentality 
where the jury might well find that the defect was 
caused by some act of the retailer. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court should be sustained but that in the 
event this court should reverse the trial court then that 
this court should direct the reinstatement of plaintiff's 
first count and submit the issue of negligence to the 
jury applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LE ROY B. YOUNG, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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